Recent contributions on Entrepreneurial Ecosystems (EE) literature tend to highlight the need for a deeper theory-based discussion of the concept and a dynamic approach on the EE evolution. The objective of this article is to contribute to this on-going discussion by proposing a novel theoretical model to understand the origin and evolution of EE, paying special attention to the drivers that are relevant to explain the successive developments in the EE trajectory and the differences between developed and developing EE. We draw our model from the study of four different empirical settings: two well-known and developed EE (Silicon Valley and Israel), and two less developed and less studied EE (Santiago de Chile and Buenos Aires).
Introduction
The entrepreneurial ecosystem (EE) concept has captured the attention of policy makers in the last years and nowadays it is widely used. However, the interest in the EE within the academic community is quite recent (Alvedalen and Boschma 2017) . Due to its novelty, EE literature has grown in an accelerated, dispersed and fragmented way (Stam and Van de Ven 2018; Acs et al. 2017 ). In addition, recent reviews tend to highlight the need for a deeper theory-based discussion of the concept and particularly, a dynamic approach on the EE evolution (e.g. Brown and Mason 2017; Stam and Van de Ven 2018; Alvedalen and Boschma 2017; Cavallo, Ghezzi, and Balocco 2018) .
In addition, much of the previous research tends to be based on the examination of case studies from highly successful regions and mature ecosystems, giving a tautological character to the phenomenon (Stam and Van de Ven 2018) . This type of approach, although illustrative of the functioning of a virtuous ecosystem is not so valuable to understand less developed ecosystems, with different types of actors, relations and trajectories (Spigel 2017) .
coming from the Radio Institute or the Microwave Laboratory.
During the 1950s Stanford's scientific and technological park was created, attracting to the Valley companies such as IBM, G.E, Westinghouse, Ames Research Center and Lockheed Aircraft and giving room to some 150 companies (Kaplan 2000) . A different business dynamic started to take place.
We cannot state that Terman and Stanford University had a deliberate strategy to build "an ecosystem" such as Silicon Valley. However, we can underline their vision and role in seeding some basic conditions, i.e., the knowledge base and the entrepreneurial spirit. These two factors would let grow some other unforeseen ones which were vital to enhance the growth and excellence of Stanford's knowledge platform and the emergence of the ecosystem.
In the mid-fifties, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) were created as a response to the Space Race started after the Soviet Union launched the Sputnik-1. By means of increasing military contracts, these agencies fuelled the knowledge base from the universities and gave incentives to the creation of new firms (Mazzucato 2015) . In parallel, new companies were created in the Valley and became iconic. The Nobel Prize winner William Shockley founded his pioneer firm in the field of semiconductors. Years later he was abandoned by eight engineers with outstanding academic credentials who persuaded the industrialist Shairman Fairchild from New York to invest in their project. Fairchild was interested in researching on satellite and missile systems and the relevance of transistors (semiconductors). They lured him with the idea of becoming the primary partner in a hybrid company that would be both a start-up and an affiliate of Fairchild Company. Fairchild Semiconductors was key in the Valley´s technological revolution by generating many spin-offs such as Intel.
Francisco. This social capital was materialized in the creation of informal spaces, events, and the emergence of dealmakers (Napier and Hansen 2011; Brown and Mason 2017) who moved from place to place laying bridges to make things happen and giving room to new possibilities.
Since this entrepreneurial process took place in different technologies over time, it helped Silicon Valley to mature without specializing just in one single industry. This helped the Valley to overcome serious challenges such as the end of the Cold War (and its impact on defense contracts), and the Japanese competition starting in the 1980's (Saxenian 1996) .
The spin-offs have been the most significant component in Silicon Valley dynamics for decades. Without them, the system could have never matured. However, this platform of newly created firms developed, scaled and coevolved together with the VC industry. Later, the phenomenon of the so called "entrepreneurial recycling" (Mason and Harrison 2006) enhanced this dynamic. As a result, successful entrepreneurs and executives from technology companies were enrolled in the creation of the most recent wave of new support organizations such as accelerators, co-work spaces, venture builders as well as new VC funds.
In sum, from an organizational perspective, Silicon Valley is an ecosystem defined as an emerging collective endeavour starting with the capabilities and resources activated by the action of institutional entrepreneurship. Opportunity identification and context exploitation were part of the game. Over time certain dynamics leveraged pre-existing conditions contributing to transform the Valley into a fertile ground due to the presence and dynamic emergence of some factors and actors, each one with its institutional and entrepreneurial logic and drive. On the one hand, culture has always been open and risk tolerant. On the other, universities and companies played a key role in the formation of an important stock of entrepreneurial human capital. Furthermore, academics and entrepreneurs have been crucial as mentors and investors facilitating the emergence of social capital. Also, lawyers have acted as business builders bridging entrepreneurs. These different actors have been vital to build networks and facilitate the emergence of new firms. They have furnished entrepreneurs with new ideas, data, advice and resources, not only in the individual processes but also in the development of a collective dynamics.
However, all this process took place without an explicit, collective leadership or a deliberate shared and devised strategy. It was the confluence of different forces and their interaction with the opportunities and resources existing in the broader national context.
The Silicon Wadi (Israel)
Although Israel could be considered as a single ecosystem due its dimensions, the largest high-tech companies' concentration is localized in the geographical area around Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem. This ecosystem shows different features. There has been a clear State leadership for many decades and the business supportive institutional platform has relied on a public-private partnership, with public and private components levered over time.
In the initial phase, the State played a key role through an important investment process that gave rise to some companies and enterprise groups that have contributed to building primary housing infrastructure, the Defense industry and universities (Nitzan and Bichler 2002) . The State proactively led the process by attracting and absorbing several Jewish immigration waves that contributed to a population increase from one million inhabitants at the foundation of Israel (1948) It has been said that the whole process of State-building was entrepreneurial itself, being the collective farms (kibbutzim) a clearer expression of this entrepreneurial spirit and a cornerstone for social capital development. At that time, Israel's economic structure was characterized by a large agricultural base combined with a growing manufacturing traditional sector, particularly during the post-II World War period. Some decades after this initial phase of the pioneers, a crucial event occurred after the Yom Kippur war. A Jewish engineer who had been one of the first employees at Intel in Silicon Valley convinced the company to set up an innovation center in Israel under his leadership (Senor and Singer 2011) . This center was vital to Intel's technological development globally.
The feasibility of this process showed that the country could become a platform to welcome other international tech companies as from 1990. Despite the ongoing conflict in the region, this process took place amidst the tech revolution acceleration.
Thus, Intel's experience may be seen as emblematic. It showed that some actors had a pivotal role in opening paths in the ecosystems, in this case, towards other international tech companies. It also showed the proactive Jewish diaspora protagonism. From a more general perspective, some talents helped place some building stones in the emergence and development of the new ecosystem (from the foundation of the collective farms or kibbutzim to the setup of firms' technology centers).
The hyperactive role of an "entrepreneurial state" (Mazzucato 2015) was also vital to build the science and technology platform (Avnimelech and Teubal 2004) . The Israeli Army also contributed to the generation of technological knowledge and entrepreneurial skills. In fact, one of the first successful waves of start-ups in the 1980's can be attributed to entrepreneurs coming from the elite military school (Talpiot) and from the intelligence unit of the Army technology development area (Nitzan and Bichler 2002 (Senor and Singer 2011; Avnimelech and Teubal 2004) . Their founders are also thought to have founded some thirty start-ups in the so-called infant phase of this ecosystem.
However, the development of entrepreneurial skills in the army has not been restricted to elites. During their two or three years of military service, youngsters develop useful competencies -in one of the most effective "schools for entrepreneurs". Individuals learn hands-on how to lead teams, assume responsibilities, run risks, solve problems, face challenges, and so on. Since Israeli citizens are taken for a period of reserve duty every year, the Army becomes also a potent source of contacts in their lifetime that help them build social networks.
After a relatively short period of adolescence, the system reached maturity after two significant moves. One was the need to face the challenge posed by an increasing wave of Jewish migrating from the former Soviet Union with broad scientific and engineering background. This led to the creation of the state/public incubators programs at the early 90´s.
At the same time, these human resources would become an important feed for the technology move in the start-ups or were hired by already settled firms. The State financed the installation of these organizations that were usually created by municipalities and universities.
The aim was to contribute to transforming R&D efforts into market solutions with technology.
The second move was the creation of the Yozma fund, one of the most successful international initiatives that fostered the venture capital industry. The State came to be an example of proactive institutional entrepreneurship in the context of a public-private alliance (Mazzucato 2015) . This initiative allowed for the system growth towards a new phase when it multiplied the venture capital offer and accelerated the increase of start-ups.
were reconverted to be led by private actors, strongly levered with public subsidies allocated to innovative entrepreneurial projects. The previous development of the ecosystem enabled investors, enterprises and former entrepreneurs to develop capabilities and to take over the incubators and to engage with high-risk new companies based on their previous experience.
This allows them to see better where to invest and channel the resources in the next phases. In turn, the State partially recover the investment through royalties.
A second moment of this "privatization" phase of the incubators occurred when the licensing system to run them was institutionalized and multinational companies were invited to join in.
Thus, a pool of venture investors, former entrepreneurs and large international firms came to be the head of the incubators. Recently, a current flow of investments in technology firms has also played a pivotal role by setting up their innovation centres and profiting from the innovative capacity of the ecosystem.
Over time, the ecosystem has become a "manufacturer of start-ups and innovations" with high rates of start-ups and exits. We can identify salient features in this ecosystem trajectory led by the State strategic vision, aimed at transforming the economy through technology and innovation. Some opportunities and challenges emerged on the road and the State capitalized them with high pragmatism, flexibility and learning capacity. The State, as a dynamic entrepreneur, has learned to change with time and provided the conditions for creating an ecosystem from very early stages levering on existing pre-conditions and building what was left. Over time, it handed the leadership over to the private sector when the development and the dynamics were gaining momentum and business incentives were in place, but it never dropped its leading role, as incubator franchisor, pre-seed/seed capital provider, infant industries promoter, and so forth. During the 90s a new wave of reforms led to a modernisation of the entire economic structure, being the services (specially the financial services) the new dominant sector in the city economy. In turn, this stimulate the emergence of some related software service activities.
The economic performance, even today, both at the local and at the national level, relies on large companies exploiting natural resources from mining, the agribusiness and some services, which results in a highly concentrated economy (De Mattos 1999).
In addition, Santiago continued (and still continues) to have a great social inequality, with a relatively large proportion of wealthy individuals and a narrow middle-class, with closed social circles rising important barriers to access to social capital of qualified networks. Access to higher education is also a sort of 'privilege' positively associated with income levels, what reinforces the previous comments. All in all, the dynamic and governance of the ecosystem has evolved. Now the leadership is more spread on co-work spaces and accelerators, the private sector and the entrepreneurs' side, with some support from the national level government.
Discussion
Once we described the historical path followed by each of the cases, it is interesting to identify whether there are some common patterns among them and to discuss some contrasts.
This discussion would allow us to gain some insights into the main drivers and determinants of EE evolution, particularly between EE with different levels of development. In the Israeli case there were in place several intangible assets such as the culture and social capital, the entrepreneurial capacities moulded by the Army, the technological and the scientific platform of universities and the finance provided by government R+D grants, which could be identified as preconditions that sparked the entrepreneurial dynamism of the EE.
In
This could explain a first wave of start-ups during the 80s.
However, throughout the evolution of this EE the State has played a significant and explicit entrepreneurial role as part of a deliberate strategy aimed at transforming Israel in a tech economy. The State was essential in the creation of the VC industry by means of the Yozma Fund but also it was critical to develop the institutional dimension (the technological incubators) trying to profit for a serendipitous event, like the Russian migration. Most of these interventions from the public sector were at the origin of the EE we witnessed today. Since Furthermore, the existence of public tuition-free universities that contribute to a broader skilled population and the presence of a wider middle-class segment fostered the emergence of entrepreneurs that throughout the years nurtured a more diversified business structure, especially in the tech sector where some unicorns emerged. However, it was not until the City government decided to intervene after the big economic crisis (2003) Santiago´s EE stands out by a significant institutional and political stability and the proactive role of the national government agency (CORFO). CORFO has been the cornerstone of the EE whose evolution followed to a great extent the changes in CORFO's programmes.
Arguably, because of the structural weaknesses of much of the framework conditions (social conditions, culture, social capital, STI platform) that made up the initial configuration of the EE, its development was more dependent on the active role of the national government. In the last years, a scale up of the Chilean EE appears associated with new public instruments but also with the emergence of new players such as some large firms' supporting entrepreneurs through open innovation processes and some private incubators/accelerators and investors. Therefore, the current ecosystem is much more diverse, nourished and sophisticated that before. However, the Government's leading role is still vital to allocate resources.
In sum, the evolution of four different EE analysed in this article allow us to identify different drivers and leaderships among these EE and how the strength and relative relevance of each driver changes over time. We could also evidence the importance of some structural preconditions for the emergence and development of the EE. This fact helps us to identify different levels of development in the four studied cases as well as the differences in the 
Corollary: Towards a dynamic model of EE evolution
Based on previous cases and discussion we propose a novel interpretative model to understand EE evolution, paying special attention to the drivers that are relevant to explain the development process in the EE trajectory and the differences between developed and developing EE.
First, we should define what EE evolution means. We describe evolution in terms of emergence and development. Both phenomena are intrinsically associated. It is not possible to trace back a precise moment in time when the EE beginsa sort of big bangjust as it is not possible to identify a moment when the origin finishes, and the development starts. EE are neither natural nor accidental. They are the result of a process of social construction (Roundy 2016 ).
What we could certainly identify are some roots, that is, a series of factors, actors and situations which define the initial conditions from where an EE starts to emerge and develop.
To discover these roots and the current stage of development of an EE is always an analytical challenge for the researchers. However, at every moment and space, there is a specific configuration of actors and factors upon which some dynamics and relations start to take place defining a trajectory of development of an EE.
In the Silicon Valley, Stanford University's strategy and Terman's leading role as an intraentrepreneur together with an open and horizontal culture, the R+D centres and the Public Procurement contracts, set up these initial conditions. In the Israeli case there were a rich social capital base, a culture that rewarded the individual initiative, a sound scientific platform built by the public R+D grants and the role played by the Army and the military service. In the Latin-American cases the initial conditions were less favourable. Nevertheless, some differences could be observed. Buenos Aires stand out because its cultural and social capital conditions and a wider middle-class segment (relative to other Latin-American countries)
whereas Santiago showed a more stable and institutional and political setting and a proactive role of the national government.
We could label this configuration as framework conditions. As the reviewed cases show, these framework conditions include the educational system, the culture and social conditions, the social capital, the knowledge platform (science and technology), business sector (diversity and density), demand conditions and the institutional system. All these variables may be considered as space-specific idiosyncratic 'assets' that influence the potential surge of wouldbe entrepreneurs and the size and wide of the opportunity space for the emergence of new ventures (Acs et al. 2016; Kantis, Federico, and Ibarra García 2018) . The degree of development of each of these framework conditions and their relations define the configuration of the EE at any moment.
The second component of our model are five dynamics or sources of "energy" (drivers). EE evolution is, hence, conceptualized as the result of the interaction between the configuration of framework conditions these dynamics (Kantis 2018). These five dynamics are:
Entrepreneurial dynamic: Conceptually, this is the core of the EE and its strength constitutes a sign of its energy and vitality, as many previously reviewed models stated. It encompasses not only the entrepreneurial process of newly born firms (start-ups) but also the growth of Business dynamic: This refers to the role played by the existing firms located in the EE, particularly the large companies and their initiatives towards entrepreneurship (for instance, open innovation, investments in start-ups, and so forth). It is also the source of spin-offs, potential mentors, and dealmakers, fuelling other dynamics of the EE such as the already mentioned entrepreneurial dynamic but also the institutional dynamic (by providing mentors for support institution) and the investment dynamic (by means of corporate venture capital funds), which will be explained bellow. So defined, our model is composed by two ontologically different levels of variables: the framework conditions on the one hand, and the dynamics or drivers on the other. The former influence the latter, which in turn transform the previous configuration of framework conditions into new configuration.
Based on this interactive process between framework conditions and driving forces, our model conceptualizes evolution as a self-reinforcing process, resembling the one proposed by Stam and Van de Ven (2018) . Hence, we could formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 1: EE evolution is defined as the result of the self-reinforcing interaction at any moment in time between a configuration of framework conditions and the dynamic of five driving forces: entrepreneurs, existing firms, investors, institutions and governments.
In some models of EE evolution, it is defined as the transition from initial phases towards maturity, assuming some archetype of how a mature ecosystem would looks like (Mack and Mayer 2016; Brown and Mason 2017) . In our understanding, evolution is explained in terms of 'quantum leaps' which do not follow a unique pattern. We can hypothesize two possible extreme cases. In the first one, EE evolution is defined as a cumulative process where framework conditions and drivers interact over the same trajectory. Therefore, small but incremental quantitative changes are accumulated over time achieving then a qualitative change. This pattern of EE evolution would be illustrated by the phenomenon of the water which is transformed into vapour once it reaches its boiling point.
As well, EE evolution could take place by means of certain (internal or external) factors and/or actors which produce by itself a qualitative transformation of the existing configuration into a new one. In this case, we refer to this pattern as catalysation and the above-mentioned factors and/or actors would be the catalysers. Furthermore, it is possible to identify combinations of the two patterns. For instance, some EE would exhibit some periods of accumulation that will generate certain 'geological layers' of actors and factors which in turn will be qualitatively changed by the intervention of some catalysers, whose transformative effect would not be possible without the previous accumulation.
In the analysed cases, in Silicon Valley there were accumulative processes of start-ups until SBICs initiative led to a superior stage of development with the creation of VC industry. The same could be said about Yozma initiative in Israel or the "privatization" of incubators. In both cases the strength of the drivers could be identified in its capacity to trigger more diversified drivers and actors (i.e. entrepreneurial, investment) and in the output of start-ups and scale ups. On the contrary, in the developing ecosystems the government seemed to have played this role of catalyser, but it was not enough to activate in the same manner the entrepreneurial dynamic, giving the less favourable framework conditions. These arguments led us to state the following proposition:
Proposition 2: EE evolution could take place as the result of two types processes: a) accumulative processes over the same trajectory which sometimes could reach certain momentum and generate a new configuration, and/or b) processes led by factors/actors which transform itself the previous configuration in a more radical way, "catalysing" the accumulated conditions.
In the context of such evolution, the different dynamics (or driving forces) co-evolve and interact each other by means of economic incentives (public or private), institutional projects and missions and the motivations and engagements from actors such as entrepreneurs, deal makers, investors mentors, institutional entrepreneurs and policy makers as Figure 2 illustrates. Some of these connections are explicit and deliberate, while others have been the The interaction between these driving forces would lead to non-linear dynamics and feedback effects (Roundy et al. 2018) . Precisely, the amount and strength of these interdependencies between the different driving forces, will explain the different trajectories of evolution that an EE could follow. In the analysed cases some differences on the trajectories could be In addition, EE are open systems and they are multi-scalar in nature (Brown and Mason 2017; Roundy et al. 2018) . This means that the external (to the territory) actors and factors may influence the evolution of a single driving force and the EE as a whole. In other words, EE evolution would be also the result of the ability of the local driving forces to successfully accommodate these external influences and leverage from them. The cases show the influence of national and local forces, altogether situated in an increasingly global context. In particular, the developed EE show how they were capable to profit from external influences, i.e. the decline in the military contracts in the Silicon Valley and the Russian migration in Israel.
Proposition 4: EE evolution is also influenced by the presence of external (to the territory) factors and actors that may affect the framework conditions and/or the driving forces and their interactions.
By means of this process of evolution, EE are constructed and developed over time, resulting from the co-evolution of framework conditions and driving forces. Consequently, EE evolution and EE development are intimately associated, moulded by its initial conditions and the relative importance of each of the driving forces and the interaction process between dynamics and framework conditions. A positive sign of EE development is the existence of certain balance between the relative importance of each of the driving forces without which the results of the EE in terms of the quantity and quality of the firms generated and scaled will not be fully realized. The examples of Silicon Valley and Israel showed that despite the leading role of the ecosystem may varied throughout the time, there has always been a tendency towards some balance. On the contrary, in the less developed ecosystems, some degree of unbalance is still evident, especially in the Chilean case. So, we propose the following proposition:
Proposition 5: The level of development of each ecosystem will associated with the framework conditions and the strength and balance of its dynamics (or driving forces) and their interrelations.
Summarizing, the present article tries to contribute to the on-going debate about EE evolution from a systemic perspective. Based on the examination of four different EE, we propose a novel interpretative model of EE evolution with an emphasis on EE with different levels of development.
This model and its five constitutive propositions will surely open new dialogues and research agendas. In addition, it has several political implications, starting from the most basic one referring to the idiosyncratic nature of the EE and the consequently discouragement of any replication attempt. The second most fundamental recommendation is to take into consideration the structural and framework conditions. This would help to understand not only the current situation of the EE but also its future possibilities given their influence over the driving forces of the EE. As well, to intervene in the EE promotion implies the recognition of the complex nature of the interdependencies among the different dynamics that constitute the driving forces that help explaining the evolution of the EE. Hence, policy making must be systemic itself, considering not only the effects over the direct beneficiaries (the entrepreneurs) but also over the broader context of the remaining actors and factors. Finally, a 
